Elusive Peace In Afghanistan

Sydney Morning Herald

Wednesday July 22, 1987

THE MILITARY conflict in Afghanistan has escalated in the last two months despite a unilateral cease-fire declared by Kabul in January. The mujahideen, now armed with sophisticated weaponry like the Stinger anti-aircraft missile, have inflicted heavy casualties on Soviet and Afghan forces. These losses must be a worry to Moscow as must be its failure, after nearly eight years of fighting, to extend the influence of the Kabul regime beyond certain urban centres. Still, only the most zealous opponents believe that the Soviets, with their estimated 115,000 troops, can ever be decisively defeated. Moscow sees its Afghan interests as vital and remains committed to defending them.

For this reason Mr Gorbachev's attempts to iron out a political solution have so far been viewed with suspicion. A failure to make concessions on central issues further undermines their credibility. Though his proposals seem impressive, they are mainly designed to undermine support for the mujahideen. Mr Gorbachev clearly calculates that if Moscow and Kabul appear sufficiently reasonable, external support for the resistance will decline, leaving the depleted guerillas to be managed by loyal Kabul forces alone.

The basic thrust of Moscow's proposals was outlined last December. After a visit to Moscow by the Afghan leader, Dr Najibullah, Kabul announced a"national reconciliation" policy to precede a coalition government. The six-month unilateral ceasefire was then announced. Although poorly observed by both sides, it has since been extended. More than 5,000 political prisoners were released earlier this year and an offer was made to hold talks with the rebels. The land reforms introduced by the Communist Party soon after it took control in 1978 were revoked in an effort to overcome the opposition of tribal and religious leaders which predated the Soviet invasion. An appeal was also made to the former king, Mohammed Zahir Shah, to return to Afghanistan.

Opponents argue that these proposals are merely designed to broaden the support base of the ruling Communist Party. Dr Najibullah intends to perpetuate the "revolution" of April 1978, in which the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan assumed power; Moscow also regards that revolution as"irreversible". Notwithstanding Najibullah's statement this week that elements of the present resistance might join his Government one day, Moscow and Kabul insist that the dominant role of the PDPA will not change. Najibullah's stated aim is to unite disparate political groups with the PDPA in a common policy program, a device that retains the PDPA as a vehicle to promote Soviet rather than Afghan interests.

These equivocal proposals at least have the virtue of moving the debate toward the crucial problem, as viewed by both the Soviets and their underground and exiled Afghan opponents: namely, the dispute over what sort of government is to survive the Soviet occupation. Unless a government is established in Kabul that is neutral and stable, the Soviets will not be inclined to leave at all. On the other hand, if there is a government dominated by the communists, the rebels will fight on. In that event, outside aid, especially from the US, would be assured, which means that the PDPA could not guarantee stability, let alone credible neutrality. A lasting settlement, then, remains beyond reach until Mr Gorbachev concedes that the PDPA is not the only party fit to rule Afghanistan.